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Abstract of CAN FORCE PROTECTION AND THEATER ENGAGEMENT PLANS PEACEFULLY CO-EXIST IN COUNTRIES WITH A HIGH TERRORIST THREAT?
Based on President Bush's Inauguration Speech, the strategy of engagement will continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy as it is enunciated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Since the national policies have not fundamentally changed with a new administration, it is incumbent on the military to adapt force protection procedures to permit the military to achieve successful engagement with high terrorist threat countries, thereby meeting the goals of the Unified Commander's Theater Engagement Plan.
The terrorist attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67) was yet another "defining moment" or "watershed event" in the three successful terrorist attacks on U.S. military targets that started with the Marine Barracks, Beirut terrorist attack in 1983 and continued with the Khobar Towers Air Force facility terrorist attack in 1996 in bringing to the forefront of the nation's attention the national policy of engagement and generated an increased demand for force protection. The misguided solution to this problem would be to disengage from developing countries and focus engagement on other countries in the region in an attempt to shape the region. I will explore the policy of engagement and the three terrorist attacks to show that engagement is too important to quit and through better force protection the U.S. military can successfully conduct this policy. Based on President Bush's Inauguration Speech, the strategy of engagement will continue to be the foundation of U.S. foreign policy as it is enunciated in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy. Since the national policies have not fundamentally changed with a new administration, it is incumbent on the military to adapt force protection procedures to permit the military to achieve successful engagement with high terrorist threat countries, thereby meeting the goals of the Unified Commander's Theater Engagement Plan.
Conducting engagement activities (including those of transiting forces) in higher threat
The missions of engagement and "forward presence" as a peacetime means of shaping regions around the world are not new to the military, particularly the U.S. Navy. From Decatur and the Barbary Coast to Perry in Japan to the around the world cruise of the Great White Fleet, forward presence and engagement by the U.S. military has been a traditional instrument in effecting this policy. The policy of engagement continues to be a complex mission, more than the Navy slogan of "Join the Navy and see the world" portrays. Adding to the problem is the absence of a clear definition of engagement in joint and Service-specific doctrine as well as the difficulty in properly evaluating it at the operational and strategic levels. The result is that the concept is easily misunderstood at the tactical level.
The application of engagement is most complex with developing countries. These are the countries that may have the symptoms of a "failing state", usually are struggling economically, have different cultures from ours, and in which limited training value is derived for the U.S. units participating in bilateral exercises with these countries. Compounding the challenges to these countries is the increased threat of terrorism from disenfranchised segments of the population.
These segments seize on the asymmetrical nature of terrorism as a means to strike at their government and counter the strength of U.S. engagement.
The terrorist attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67) was yet another "defining moment" or "watershed event" in the three successful terrorist attacks on U.S. military targets that started with the Marine Barracks, Beirut terrorist attack in 1983 and continued with the Khobar Towers Air
Force facility terrorist attack in 1996 in bringing to the forefront of our nation's attention the policy of engagement and generated an urgent demand for force protection. One misguided solution to this problem would be simply to disengage from developing countries and focus engagement on other countries in the region in an attempt to shape the region. I will explore the policy of engagement and the three terrorist attacks to show that engagement is too important a strategy to be abandoned; and through better force protection measures, show that the U.S. military can, indeed, successfully conduct this policy. One of the most difficult parts of Peacetime Military Engagement is engagement with developing countries. For this paper I will define developing countries as those countries with the following attributes: geographically -they are predominantly in Africa and the Middle East, economically and politically -they are increasingly falling behind the western world primarily due to a lack of natural resources and/or due to rampant ethnic or religious tensions. These countries are the breeding ground for failed states as well as other international problems as crime, illegal immigrants, drugs, disease, pollution, terrorism and the smuggling of weapons of mass destruction.
THE POLICY OF ENGAGEMENT
These countries are also very different from the United States due to differences, for example in their language, culture, government, military capabilities and economy. These are the countries in which at the tactical level, "liberty for the crew" is poor to non-existent and "crew training" during a bilateral exercise is also poor to unproductive. Additionally, a number of these developing and tactics, techniques and procedures that will ensure the safety of our service members and their mission accomplishment. This paper will address force protection issues and lessons learned from these three major terrorist acts of the past for integration into future operations. The following were the most significant of the Downing Commission recommendations regarding force protection: for the Department of Defense to define a single force protection standard, promulgating directives that are "directive" instead of being "advisory" in nature. The findings of the Downing report made a significance impact on the Department of Defense, which quickly responded in establishing a higher standard for force protection. Yet force protection procedures, training, tactics, and techniques still remained inconsistent and differed widely throughout a theater by location and by Service. Additionally, another negative impact on overseas force protection was the limited availability of trained U.S. military personnel for base security. This deficiency has forced local commanders to use host nation and other foreign personnel to augment U.S. security forces to maintain adequate security.
From a mission standpoint, the Khobar Towers attack was different from the Beirut attack in its response by the United States' National Command Authorities. Instead of pulling out of Saudi Arabia, the U.S. and its Allies resumed the mission of Operation Southern Watch three days after the attack and significantly elevated force protection to a major mission in the operation. Secretary
Perry stated in his report to the President, "Sacrificing our strategic interests in response to terrorist acts is an unacceptable alternative. We cannot be a great power a live in a risk-free world.
Therefore we must gird ourselves for a relentless struggle in which there will be many silent victories and some noisy defeats."
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USS COLE (DDG 67) -11 October 2000
Since the attack on Khobar Towers in June 1996, the Department of Defense has made significant improvements in protecting its service members, mainly in deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attacks on installations (emphasis part of report). The attack on the USS COLE (DDG 67)...demonstrated a seam in the fabric of efforts to protect our forces, namely in-transit forces. Our review was focused on finding ways to improve the United States policies and practices for deterring, disrupting and mitigating terrorist attack on US forces in transit.
Department of Defense USS COLE Commission report of 9 January 2001 16
Terrorists attacked the ARLEIGH BURKE -class guided missile destroyer, USS COLE (DDG 67), on 11 October 2000, two hours after the ship had moored at a refueling pier in the port of Aden, Yemen. Despite having refueled several other U.S. naval ships which were transiting to or from the Persian Gulf without underway replenishment opportunities, Aden was considered by the Department of State to be a potentially dangerous due to a threat of terrorism, but was still considered to be safer by CENTCOM than several other alternative ports in the area and was designated as Threat Level BRAVO. 17 Additionally, the refueling and daylong presence of a U.S.
ship was part of the CINC's Theater Engagement Plan to demonstrate naval presence and peacetime engagement for Yemen. Secretary Webb's quote was the first salvo in the public debate concerning the policy of engagement in the aftermath of the COLE attack. Webb elaborated in his speech that he believes that "COLE was sent into harm's way because of an errant U.S. policy that uses warships as diplomatic tools." 22 The Senate Armed Services committee also met to discuss the issue and stated, "The whole concept of making stops in high-risk ports for operational needs as well as furthering political objectives is now being reviewed." 23 In addition to the COLE attack, the committee also questioned the port call and associated bilateral exercise to the port of Algiers, These events were evidence to the disengagement proponents that the U.S. no longer had the ability to effectively shape the region and instead was hazarding Americans in their futile attempt to persist.
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The disengagement proponents also based their arguments on the economics of oil. The U.S. military has attempted to exploit the lessons learned from the Beirut, Khobar
Towers and COLE attacks to continue to improve in the fight to reduce the threat of terrorism.
There is no question that the U.S. military's anti-terrorism and counter-terrorism training and methodology have improved after each event and, probably will continue to improve. The world continues to be a dangerous place in which the number of terrorist attacks increased last year.
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Consistent with the trend, the present day asymmetrical threats of weapons of mass destruction and computer network attack are more lethal from a human life and economic standpoint and are a significant terrorist threat to the U.S. military.
Force protection is the last line of defense against the direct threat of terrorism to U.S.
forces and must be applied wisely to ensure its effectiveness against the threat without losing sight of the unit's primary mission. I believe that the changes implemented by the Department of Defense due to recommendations from the Downing Commission resulted in dramatic security improvements for base installations. I also believe that the COLE Commission recommendations will be acted on and will provide similar results for military units in transit.
The national policy of engagement and "forward presence" that we have espoused have been proven as effective and is too important to national security and world wide stability to be reversed or undermined by the threat of terrorism. A retrenchment from the current engagement policy or a shift to selective disengagement policy as a tenet of future foreign policy or as a method to minimize the threat of terrorism would be short-sighted and unsound. In the short term, disengagement is attractive since it will possibly save lives or units that could be targets for terrorist.
In the longer term, however, its impact will be detrimental to regional and world security and provide the opportunity for a leadership vacuum that will be quickly filled by terrorists or other regional powers with aspirations to increased influence at the expense of another country. Recent 
RECOMMENDATIONS
I agree with all the COLE Commission's recommendations for improving force protection.
The report's recommendation argues for more intelligence, more training, more support and coordination from the theater Service component commanders and theater CINC staffs, more resources for improved force protection equipment and technology; and better defined doctrine. All these recommendations are outstanding and could have a significant impact. The two areas that require the most attention are unit training and theater support from the commanders.
Effective unit level force protection training for ships will be particularly difficult, though not impossible. In the long term, the Navy needs to establish a career field for tactical force protection officers and petty officers, who would be the experts and trainers on all units and staffs. The present system of using a ship's poorly trained and understaffed Master at Arms force or assigning an already overworked division officer with another collateral duty and minimum training as the unit force protection officer is inadequate. Until this career field is established and introduced into the fleet, ship crews will require dramatically increased training in small arms; anti-terrorism measures; rules of engagement; and a new inport force protection command and control plan to properly employ a ship's force protection team.
My recommendation for theater support from the component commander and CINC's staff is to use the Reserve Port Security units to train up several Port Security detachments that can be deployed throughout a theater for increased security and augmentation to ship's force protection teams during port visits. These detachments would work with the U.S. country teams (local embassy, Defense Attaché, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) agent, civilian logistic support personnel; and host nation military to conduct current port vulnerability assessments prior to the visit and security during the visit. Optimally each of these detachments would also have a member fluent in the local language. Furthermore, with their local knowledge and personal contacts they would be a force multiplier in supporting a visiting ship's force protection force. To increase their knowledge of national culture and local threats, the detachments would be assigned a region of a theater to allow them to remain current with the issues and threats of each port. Additionally, the size of these detachments would be based on the security requirements for each port and most importantly would provide the commanders at all levels a source for local intelligence that, in conjunction with the Defense Attaché, would recognize changes in the local environment that could spell a threat to visiting ships. These detachments would be increasingly valuable in the future as the Navy shifts to minimum manned ships, unable to provide their own effective force protection.
No single recommendation will solve the threat of terrorism to transiting units in a high threat port, but as we learned from Beirut and Khobar Towers, the lessons we have learned from these attacks must be heeded and will go a long way to mitigating the risk of future attacks while the policy of engagement is executed.
